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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SURVEY
INTRODUCTION
During 1993, the Tenth Circuit's attention in the intellectual property
arena focused on copyright protection of computer software programs. In
Autoskill v. National Educational Support Systems,1 the court affirmed the
New Mexico District Court's preliminary injunction against Autoskill,
whose computer software program designed to teach reading skills copied
the protectable elements of National Educational Support System's com-
peting copyrighted program. 2 Most notably, the court held that a three-
step analysis combining abstraction, filtration, and comparison was a per-
missible method for determining "substantial similarity" in computer
software programs.3 Although the court found it unnecessary to indicate
what method of analysis it would employ upon review of a final copyright
infringement judgment, the opportunity to clarify its position came in
Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chemical Industries, Ltd.,4 whereby the court ex-
pressly adopted the three-step approach articulated in AutoskilL5 Addi-
tionally, the Gates court provided further guidance concerning the role of
the abstractions step in substantial similarity analysis as well as suggesting
district courts engage in a preliminary "holistic" comparison of the pro-
grams at issue prior to undertaking separation of the protectable expres-
sion from non-protectable elements of the allegedly infringed program.
6
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the Colorado District
Court's order in Gates that found copyright infringement of a computer
program designed to determine the size of industrial machine belts. 7 The
court concluded the district court failed to identify certain protectable ele-
ments of the program, and also extended copyright protection to certain
unprotected elements.8
Although the Tenth Circuit's decision to adopt this three-step
method of substantial similarity analysis will likely lead to narrower copy-
right protection for computer software programs, it does provide a long
overdue framework for Tenth Circuit district courts struggling to deter-
mine copyright protection for computer software programs.
This Survey examines the Autoskill and Gates decisions in light of the
adoption of yet another "substantial similarity" test, together with its likely
impact in future copyright infringement actions.
1. 994 F.2d 1476 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 307 (1993).
2. Id. at 1481.
3. Id. at 1490-91.
4. 9 F.3d 823 (10th Cir. 1993).
5. Id. at 834.
6. It. at 841.
7. Id. at 849.
8. Id. at 830.
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I. BACKGROUND
A. Scope of Copyright Protection for Computer Programs
Copyright law protects original, creative expression against copying,
but does not protect ideas, processes, or methods of operation. 9 This is
because the constitutional purpose of copyright law is to "promote the
Progress of Science and the useful Arts" by granting protection to works of
authorship, but not to any underlying idea.10 Therefore, copyright en-
courages people to build freely on the ideas of others, while secondarily
protecting the rights of authors in the original expression of their ideas. 1
Congress, in passing the Copyright Act of 197612 ("Act"), suggested
the applicability of copyright law to computer programs.1 3 In 1980, Con-
gress further amended the Act to more clearly cover computer programs
in the general definition section.1 4 Thus, while computer programs are
generally the subject of copyright protection, 15 the ideas embodied in a
computer program are no more protectable than the ideas embodied in
any other copyrighted work.16
Recent cases addressing the scope of copyright protection for com-
puter programs conclude that copyright protects not only the literal text
of the program code (both human readable and machine readable), but,
as in the case of any other "literary work," extends to its non-literal ele-
ments. 17 Non-literal elements of a program encompass its "look and feel"
and include so much of its structure, sequence or organization, and visual
9. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988) ("[I]n no case does copyright protection for an original
work of authorship extend to any idea .... ."); H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. at 57
(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5670 (17 U.S.C. § 102(b) intended actual
processes or methods embodied in the computer program not to be within the scope of
copyright law); 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) ("[Clopyright protection subsists
... in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression .... from
which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated . . . ."); Computer
Assocs. Int'l v. Altai, 982 F.2d 693, 703 (2nd Cir. 1992). See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102
(1879) (system of accounting described in book is not protected by copyright-only written
expression used to describe the system is protected).
10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
11. Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991).
12. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1010 (1988 & Supp. IV 1993).
13. See, e.g., Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 49 (D. Mass.
1990) (computer programs are copyrightable); H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. at
51 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5664 (17 U.S.C. § 102(b) applies to computer
programs).
14. Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517 § 10, 94 Stat. 3015, 3028.
15. Johnson Controls v. Phoenix Control Sys., 886 F.2d 1173, 1175 (9th Cir. 1989); Wil-
liams Elecs. v. Artic Int'l, 685 F.2d 870, 875 (3d Cir. 1982).
16. Apple Computer v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1252-53 (3d Cir.
1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984).
17. Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 198 (1992) (copyright protection applies to the user interface, or overall structure and
organization of a computer program, including its audiovisual displays, or screen "look and
feel"); see also Johnson Controls; 886 F.2d at 1175 ("non-literal components of a program, in-
cluding the structure, sequence, and organization and user interface" are copyrightable); see
generally, Apple Computer v. Formula Int'l, 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984) (computer programs




display as to effectively constitute expression.18 Courts will not, however,
protect non-literal elements that contain ideas or expression merged with
ideas. 19
Because of these limitations, "[t]he breadth of copyright protection a
court extends to a computer program is directly related to where that
court draws the line between idea and expression." 20 This distinction
frustrates courts' efforts to compare or reconcile claims of substantial simi-




As a practical matter, copyright infringement turns on whether the
accused work is "substantially similar" to protected elements of the copy-
righted work. 22 Although an infringement plaintiff must prove ownership
of a valid copyright,23 and establish access by the defendant to the copy-
righted and allegedly infringed program,2 4 validity may be presumptively
shown by a certificate of copyright registration, 25 and access is often either
conceded or easily proven.26 Thus, substantial similarity is often disposi-
18. See, e.g., Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987). Using a novel as an analogy, the written words would be the
code and the organization of the chapters, characters, and story would be the non-literal
elements. Id. at 1234.
19. See also Broum Bag Software, 960 F.2d at 1475-77 (recognizing unprotectable expres-
sion); Data East USA v. Epyx, Inc., 862 F.2d 204, 208 (9th Cir. 1988); Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at
58 (stating that expression is not copyrightable if it merely embodies elements of the idea).
20. Dennis M. McCarthy, Copyright Infringement-Redefining the Scope of Protection Copyright
Affords the Non-Literal Elements of a Computer Program-Computer Associates International, Inc.
v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992), 66 TEMP. L. REV. 273 (1993).
21. See, e.g., Soft Computer Consultants v. Lalehzarzadeh, 1989 Copyright L. Dec. (CCH)
22,403 at 22,538 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (stating that the "general standard for establishing copy-
ing is the substantial similarity test"); see also 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER
ON COPYRIGHT: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF LrERARY, MUSICAL, AND ARTISTIC PROPERTY, AND
THE PROTECTION OF IDEAS § 13.03[B] [2] [a] (1993) [hereinafterNiMMER] (discussing the idea-
expression dichotomy as it relates to substantial similarity analysis); see infra text accompany-
ing note 35.
22. See Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465, 1472 (1992) (absent evi-
dence of direct copying, unauthorized copying is proven by demonstrating substantial
similarity).
23. Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991) (copyright in-
fringement is proven by: (1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent
elements of the original work).
24. Access may be established by showing that the defendant had a "reasonable opportu-
nity to view" or "opportunity to copy" the allegedly infringed work. NIMMER, supra note 21,
§ 13.02[A] at 13-17.
25. 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (1988) (certificate of registration of a copyright shall constitute
prima facie evidence of a valid copyright.) See Frybarger v. Int'l Business Machs., 812 F.2d
525, 529 (9th Cir. 1987).
26. See Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., 797 F.2d 1222, 1232 (3d Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987) (noting defendant's access was uncontested because the pro-
gram was used in his laboratory, and he acted as a sales representative for plaintiff);
Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1136 (N.D. Cal. 1986)
(noting that plaintiff gave defendant "several commercially-available copies" of the pro-
gram); NIMMER, supra note 21, § 13.02.
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tive. 27 However, even if substantial similarities are found, courts must de-
termine whether the similarities relate to protected elements of
expression or instead to unprotected expression or ideas for which no lia-
bility attaches.
Several approaches for determining what constitutes protected non-
literal elements of computer' programs for copyright infringement pur-
poses have been explored by many courts. These multiple and fractured
approaches have created the present chaotic status of substantial similarity
analysis. With the Autoskill and Gates decisions, the Tenth Circuit begins
participating in the difficult task of refining the analysis.
1. Whelan Associates - The Functional Approach
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals articulated the most expansive
protection for non-literal elements of computer programs in Whelan Associ-
ates v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory,28 whereby the court held the purpose or
function of a utilitarian work would be the work's idea, and everything
that is not necessary to that purpose or function would be part of the ex-
pression of the idea.29 Some courts have adopted this reasoning,30 while
others have rejected it.3 1 The primary criticism of this approach is of its
assumption that a computer program has only one idea.
3 2
2. The "Total Concept and Feel" Approach
Another broad approach was recently taken in Lotus Development Corp.
v. Paperback Software InternationaL33 The court rejected dissection of every
element of the allegedly infringed work, opting instead for first determin-
ing whether its elements are copyrightable and then identifying whether
those elements, considered as a whole, were impermissibly copied. 34 This
test has also been criticized for its sweeping protection and lack of detailed
analysis.
35
27. John W.L. Ogilvie, Note, Defining Computer Program Parts Under Learned Hand's Ab-
stractions Test in Software Copyright Infringement Cases, 91 MIcH. L. REv. 526, 527 (1992).
28. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
29. Id. at 1238; Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 65 (D.
Mass. 1990).
30. See, e.g., Broderbund Software, 648 F. Supp. at 1133.
31. See Plains Cotton Co-op Ass'n v. Goodpasture Computer Serv., 807 F.2d 1256, 1262
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 821 (1987); Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Am., Inc., 798 F.
Supp. 1499, 1513 (D. Colo. 1992) (adopting two-prong analysis), aff'd in part and vacated in
part, 9 F.3d 823 (1993); cf. Synercom Technology v. University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp.
1003, 1014 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
32. Richard A. Golihofer, Copyright Protection of Computer Software: What Is It and How Did
We Get It?, 5 SovrwaaE L.J. 695 (1992).
33. 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990).
34. Id. at 67; see Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prod. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157,
1167 (9th Cir. 1977); Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1109-10 (9th
Cir. 1970). See generally NIMMER, supra note 21, § 13.03[A][1][cl (discussingthehistoryofthe
total concept and feel test).
35. "[T]he addition of 'feel' to the judicial inquiry, being a wholly amorphous referent,
merely invites an abdication of analysis." NIMMER, supra note 21, § 13.03[A] at 13-37.
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3. Levels of Abstractions Approach
Judge Learned Hand's famous "patterns of abstractions" analysis ar-
ticulated in Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp.3 6 was first applied to plays and
screenplays. Under this analysis, a court must determine the patterns or
components of the protected work on a continuum from the most general
to the most specific and then identify which of these are no more than a
formulation of the idea.3 7 Although this method of analysis is both unpre-
dictable and ad hoc,3 8 courts appear to be prepared to adapt these princi-
ples3 9 with some modifications for cases involving computer software.
40
4. The Three-Step Approach
In response to the broad protection afforded to non-literal elements
of computer programs under Whelan41 and Lotus,4 2 the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit crafted a narrower three-part approach for estab-
lishing "substantial similarity" of computer software. In Computer Associates
International v. Altai,43 the court begins its analysis by borrowing from
Learned Hand's abstractions formula, dissecting the allegedly infringed
program's structure and isolating it into its various levels of abstraction.
44
Once the program has been dissected into its various levels of
abstraction, the court undertakes the second step, filtration. 45 In the
filtration process, the court eliminates unprotectable elements consist-
ing of ideas, elements subject to external factors, 46 and material in
36. 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931).
37. "Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of patterns of increas-
ing generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the incident is left out." Id. at 121.
38. Judge Learned Hand wrote of the line between expression and idea that "[n]obody
has ever been able to fix that boundary, and nobody ever can." Id. He echoed this view in a
later opinion, stating that "[o]bviously, no principle can be stated as to when an imitator has
gone beyond copying the 'idea,' and has borrowed its 'expression.' Decisions must therefore
inevitably be ad hoc." Peter Pan Fabrics v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir.
1960).
39. Ogilvie, supra note 27, at 528-29 (arguing that although Judge Hand's test is not a
panacea for all the current ills of software copyright law, it provides courts with a framework
that should increase the consistency of decisions).
40. See supra text accompanying note 31.
41. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
42. 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990).
43. 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
44. Id. at 707.
45. Id.
46. External factors include:
(1) the mechanical specifications of the computer on which a program is intended
to run; (2) compatibility requirements of other programs with which a program is
designed to operate in conjunction; (3) computer manufacturer's design standards;
(4) demands of the industry being serviced; and (5) widely accepted programming
practices within the computer industry.
Id. at 709-10 (citations omitted); see also Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S.
340, 361-64 (1991) (if the only unauthorized copying is of those elements that are not pro-
tectable, then the resulting copy will not constitute an infringement); NIMMER, supra note 21,
§ 13.03 [8] [2].
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the public domain or subject to the doctrines of merger and scones d
faire.
47
The final step involves an actual comparison of the remaining non-
literal program elements. 48 Once all non-protectable elements are
filtered out, courts will apply an "extrinsic" test to determine whether sub-
stantial similarity exists between the two programs. 49 This is accomplished
primarily through the use of experts. 50 If similarity is found, some courts
may also employ an "intrinsic" test that measures substantial similarity ac-
cording to the response of the ordinary lay observer. 51 While some courts
endorse the lay observer test 52 in computer program cases, others reject it
due to the inherent technical expertise required.
5 3
In Autoskill the Tenth Circuit found this narrower three-step ap-
proach a permissible method for determining substantial similarity of
computer software programs54 and then formally adopted it in the Gates
decision.
55
II. THE Au-Tos=zL DECISION
A. Facts and Procedural History
Autoskill, Inc. ("Autoskill"), a Canadian corporation, developed a
computer software program for use in teaching reading skills to students
with reading disabilities entitled "Autoskill: Component Reading and Sub-
skills Testing and Training Program."56 Autoskill obtained a United States
Certificate of Registration of the copyright on the software program
("Autoskill Program").
57
National Educational Support Systems, Inc. ("NESS"), is a New Mex-
ico corporation. One of the principals in NESS, Ron Neil, was familiar
with the Autoskill Program, and unsuccessfully attempted to obtain a li-
cense to market it.58 Neil then entered into an agreement with a com-
puter programming firm, Automation Consultants, Inc. (ACI), to develop
47. Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 710 (courts must filter out all unoriginal elements of a
program, including those elements that are found in the public domain or subject to the
doctrines of merger and scines d faire); see infra notes 86-87.
48. Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 710.
49. See, e.g., Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1356 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Whelan
Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., 797 F.2d 1222, 1232 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
50. Sid & Marty Kroffl Television Prod. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1159, 1164 (1977).
51. See, e.g., Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465, 1475, cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 198 (1992); Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468-69 (2d Cir. 1946).
52. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1233; see also Autoskill v. Nat'l Educ. Support Sys., 793 F. Supp.
1557, 1569 (1992), aff'd, 994 F.2d 1476 (10th Cir.), and cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 307 (1993)
(noting the appropriateness of examining lay evidence and exhibits presented by the parties
to determine substantial similarities).
53. Dawson v. Hinshaw Music, 905 F.2d 731, 732-37 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 981
(1990) (holding that lay observer test not practical in the context of computer programs).
54. Autoskill, 994 F.2d at 1490-91.
55. Gates, 9 F.3d at 834.
56. Autoskill, 994 F.2d at 1481.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1481-82 (Neil's familiarity and use of the Autoskill Program was sufficient to
meet the access requirement). Id. at 1559.
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software "to be like" the Autoskill Program.5 9 ACI's program for NESS was
called "Nessi: Reading and Language Development Program" (Nessi).
6 °
NESS's distributor received a letter from Autoskill's attorney shortly after
it began marketing Nessi indicating it could be named in a copyright in-
fringement action.
6 1
NESS filed suit in the District of New Mexico seeking a declaratory
judgment that it did not infringe the Autoskill copyright.62 Autoskill re-
sponded by suing NESS for copyright infringement, and sought a prelimi-
nary inunction to prevent continued infringement.63 Autoskill claimed
NESS's program infringed upon the non-literal elements of Autoskill's
Program. 64 The cases were consolidated.
B. District Court Holding
The district court granted Autoskill a preliminary injunction prohibit-
ing NESS from impinging upon the "protectable elements" of the Autos-
kill Program. 65 It employed a three-step method of analysis, combining
abstraction, filtration, and comparison to determine the "substantial simi-
larity" of the programs. 66 The court rejected the functional approach es-
poused in Whelan6 7 as a "temptingly simplistic bright line test"68 that could
not account for the reality that many ideas may exist in a given work, and
also rejected the "total concept and feel" test, as being more appropriate
when evaluating "simplistic works."69 Rather, the court opted for an analy-
sis similar to the one recently employed by the Second Circuit in Computer
Associates.
70
The court concluded that the identification and use of three subtypes
of students with reading difficulties were not protectable, because these
subtypes were identified and discussed in literature available to the pub-
lic. 71 The "idea" of teaching reading, based on these subtypes, was also
not protectable; however, Autoskill's "manner" of teaching and the way it
communicates those ideas to students and teachers amounts to protect-
able "expression."72 Thus, the court emphasized pedagogical similarity,
59. Id. at 1481.






66. Autoskill, 793 F. Supp. at 1565.
67. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text discussing Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow
Dental Lab., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
68. Autoski, 793 F. Supp. at 1566.
69. Id. at 1515-70.
70. See supra notes 43-47 discussing Computer Assocs. Int'l. v. Altai, 982 F.2d 693, 710
(2d Cir. 1992).
71. Autoskill 793 F. Supp. at 1566. The program is designed to test or diagnose and
train three distinct subtypes. Type 0 is the oral reading subtype, Type A is the intermodal-
associative deficit subtype, and Type S is the sequential deficit subtype. Id. at 1559.
72. Id. at 1566.
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rather than the logical flow of the program. NESS appealed, raising a
number of procedural 7
3 and substantive issues.7
4
C. The Tenth Circuit Opinion
In Autoskil4 the Tenth Circuit began its substantial similarity analysis
by first examining the district court's factual findings concerning the over-
all similarities between the Autoskill and Nessi Programs. 75 In general,
the Autoskill Program is designed to improve a student's rapid automatic
response to training stimuli.7 6 It tests students for oral reading, audio-
visual matching, visual matching, and visual scanning according to thir-
teen categories of word-form types that are based on different combina-
tions of vowels and consonants. 7 7 The tests use words and non-words
while recording the student's accuracy and response speed.78 Based on
the testing results, the students are assigned a training program that corre-
sponds to their subtypes.
79
The district court determined that NESS's program had merely
changed the names and sequence of the tests with minor format
changes. 80 The three main sections of each program consisting of testing
or diagnosis, profile analysis, and training utilized similar criteria and per-
formed substantially similar functions.
8 1
Satisfied with the district court's findings that both programs were
substantially similar, the court undertook a review of the three-step ap-
proach used for identifying which non-literal elements of Autoskill's Pro-
gram were protected from infringement.
8 2
73. The Tenth Circuit rejected Autoskill's arguments that NESS's notice of appeal was
untimely pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362, which prevented NESS from appealing the preliminary
injunction due to an automatic bankruptcy stay and, further, that NESS filed its notice of
appeal outside the 30 days allowed by Rule (4) (a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Proce-
dure. Autoskil4 994 F.2d at 1483. The court held that the filing of a bankruptcy petition by
NESS extended the time for filing a notice of appeal. Id. Additionally, the bankruptcy rules
authorized NESS to prosecute its appeal from a grant of a preliminary injunction in a copy-
right infringement action without authorization from the bankruptcy court. See id. at 1486.
74. The Tenth Circuit rejected the trial court's reasoning concerning its refusal to retro-
actively apply the U.S. Supreme Court's 1989 holding in Community for Creative Non-Vio-
lence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989), distinguishing "employees" from "independent
contractors" for purposes of copyright ownership of "works made for hire." Id. at 1488.





80. Id. See supra part II.B.2. discussing the district court's findings.
81. Autoskil, 994 F.2d at 1490.
82. "Infringement is shown by a substantial similarity of protectable expression, not just




1. The Levels of Abstraction Step
The court concluded that although the district court did not precisely
use the abstractions analysis outlined in Computer Associates,8 3 its ruling
should not be reversed simply because of a lack of any particular detail.
8 4
Further, the court found an ample factual basis for the district judge's
analysis on the levels of abstraction and his conclusions as to which were
idea levels not entitled to protection, and those possibly eligible for pro-
tection after the filtration analysis which were in the expression area.
85
2. The Filtration Step
The court again agreed with the district court's application of the fil-
tration step whereby it filtered out portions of the Autoskill Program's ex-
pression not entitled to copyright protection, employing the copyright
doctrines of merger86 and scines dfaire.87 Specifically, the thirteen catego-
ries of vowel and consonant combinations as well as the silent sentence
and silent paragraph components were excluded from copyright protec-
tion.88 However, the court upheld copyright protection of the "keying
procedure," finding the procedure reflected at least a minimal degree of
creativity and did not constitute a "method of operation" or "process" pre-
cluded from copyright protection.89 The court reasoned that NESS failed
to produce any evidence that the procedure was common practice and
should therefore, be filtered out of the analysis.90
3. The Comparison Step
Substantial similarity analysis concludes with a comparison of portions
of the alleged infringer's works with the portions of the complaining
83. See supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text discussing Computer Assocs. Int'l v.
Altai, 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
84. NESS claimed the trial court erred when it examined the similarities in the functions
performed as the highest level of abstraction, rather than from the code level up to the
program's function. Autoskill 994 F.2d at 1492.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1494. See Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991).
Where a particular expression is common to the treatment of a specific idea, process, or
discovery, it lacks the originality for copyright protection. See, e.g., Toro Co. v. R & R Prods.
Co., 787 F.2d 1208, 1211 (8th Cir. 1986) (under copyright merger doctrine, copyright protec-
tion will be denied even to some expressions of ideas if idea behind expression is such that it
can be expressed only in very limited number of ways). The merger doctrine excludes ex-
pression from copyright protection if it is "merged" inseparably with an idea. NIMMER, supra
note 21, § 13.03[B][3] at 13-74.
87. The "scdns dfaire" doctrine generally excludes from copyright protection, material
that is "standard," "stock," or "common" to a particular topic or that "necessarily follow from
a common theme or setting." NIMMER, supra note 21, § 13.03[B] [4] at 13-70.
88. Autoskill, 994 F.2d at 1494.
89. Id. at 1495 n.23. See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 214 (1954) (originality de-
notes only enough definite expression so that one may distinguish authorship); compare Toro
Co., 787 F.2d at 1208 (lawn care matching part numbering system not original) with Hutchin-
son Tel. Co. v. Frontier Directory Co., 770 F.2d 128 (8th Cir. 1985) (telephone white pages
directory original work).
90. Autoskull 994 F.2d at 1495.
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party's work determined to be legally protectable under the Act.9" The
court again agreed with the district court's assessment of substantial simi-
larity based upon a comparison of the two programs' structure, sequence,
and organization and rejected NESS's argument that no protectable ele-
ments of the Autoskill Program remained upon completion of the filtra-
tion step.92 Additionally, the district court's use of expert testimony
throughout its analysis was not erroneous.
93
III. THE GATES DECISION
A. Facts and Procedural History
Gates Rubber Co. ("Gates") is a Colorado corporation manufacturing
rubber belts for use in industrial machinery. 94 Gates developed a com-
puter software program entitled Design Flex 4.0 ("Gates Program"), which
calculates the proper Gates belt for a specified machine.9 5 The program
utilizes published formulas in conjunction with certain mathematical con-
stants developed by Gates for determining belt size.96 Gates obtained a
Certificate of copyright registration on the Gates Program.
97
Bando American (Bando) is a division of a Japanese corporation that
competes with Gates in the manufacture and sale of industrial belts. 98 Nu-
merous Bando employees were former Gates employees, including Steven
Piderit, who had access to the components and the design of the Gates
Program. 99 In 1990, Bando made available its "Chauffeur" Program, a
program similar to the Gates Program.
100
In 1992, Gates filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Colorado alleging copyright infringement, unfair competition, misappro-
priation of trade secrets, as well as breach of contract.10 '
B. District Court Holding
The district court held that the Chauffeur Program infringed the
Gates's copyright' 0 2 and that Bando had misappropriated Gates's trade
secrets.10 3 Specifically, it found that Bando had misappropriated ten pro-
91. Id. at 1496. See Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 710 ("The analysis at this point poses
essentially a value judgment, involving an assessment of the importance of the material that
was copied."). See NIMMER, supra note 21, § 13.03[F] at 13-146.
92. Autoski, 994 F.2d at 1496.
93. Id. at 1497-98 ("We are satisfied the judge's crediting of the Autoskill witness testi-
mony over that of NESS's, was not clearly erroneous or an abuse of discretion.").





99. Id. (there was evidence Piderit pirated a copy of the Gates Program and brought it
with him to Bando).
100. Id. at 831.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. The District court concluded that Bando had misappropriated trade secrets be-
longing to Gates, ordered their return, and enjoined Bando from any further use. Id. The
Tenth Circuit affirmed. Id. at 830. It rejected Bando's argument that Gates's claims were
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tected elements of the Gates Program, including its menus, constants, sort-
ing criteria, control flow, data flow, the engineering calculation module,
the design module, common errors, fundamental tasks, and install files.
10 4
Bando appealed, claiming the district court erred when it extended
copyright protection for what it characterized as facts and ideas in the
Gates Program. 10 5 Bando further appealed the district court's granting of
trade secret protection to Gates's program constants.
10 6
C. Tenth Circuit's Opinion
The Tenth Circuit began by acknowledging that the proper test for
determining substantial similarity had not been previously addressed in
this circuit and, consequently, that its opinion was intended to bring clar-
ity to district courts struggling with copyright protection of computer
software programs. 10 7 The court adopted in substantial part the abstrac-
tion, filtration, and comparison test set forth in Autoskill and by the Sec-
ond Circuit in Computer Associates, finding it an effective test formed from
constitutional and statutory constraints and guided by existing case law. 10 8
Specifically, the courts should first dissect the program according to
its varying levels of generality as provided in the abstractions test. 109 Next,
courts should examine each level of abstraction in order to filter out those
elements of the programs that are unprotectable, eliminating from com-
parison the unprotectable elements of ideas, processes, facts, public do-
main information, merger material, scines d faire material, and other
unprotectable elements suggested by the particular facts of the program
under examination. 1 10 Finally, courts should then compare the remain-
ing protectable elements with the allegedly infringing program to deter-
mine whether there has been a misappropriation of substantial elements
of the protected program.
11 1
preempted by federal law and specifically found that because Gates's trade secret misappro-
priation claim under the Colorado Uniform Trade Secrets Act requires proof of a breach of
trust or confidence, an element not required under the Copyright Act, Gates' state claims
were not preempted by federal law. Id. at 846-48. Further, the constants constituted trade
secrets and although they were disclosed during the permanent injunction hearing, Gates'
post-hearing measures to protect the confidentiality of the constants maintained their status
as trade secrets, i at 848-49.
104. Id at 842-46.
105. Id. at 830.
106. Id.
107. Id The court was aided in its analysis of the copyright law concerning computer
programs by briefs submitted by amicus curiae: the American Committee for Interoperable
Systems; Computer and Business Equipment Manufacturers Association; the International
Anticounterfeiting Coalition, Inc.; Adobe Systems, Inc.; Apple Computer, Inc.; Computer
Associates International, Inc.; Digital Equipment Corporation, Inc.; International Business
Machines Corporation; Lotus Development Corporation; Wordperfect Corporation; and
Xerox Corporation. Id. at 831 n.3.
108. Id. at 834; see also Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 701-14; Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 37.
109. Gates, 9 F.3d at 834. See supra notes 41-44, 83-85, and accompanying text discussing
the abstractions step.
110. Gates, 9 F.3d at 834. See supra notes 45-47, 86-90, and accompanying text discussing
the filtering step.
111. Gates, 9 F.3d at 834. See supra notes 48-52, 91-93, and accompanying text discussing
the comparison step.
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The court suggested, however, that prior to undertaking these steps,
it would be helpful for courts to make an initial determination of whether
the defendant copied portions of the allegedly infringed program before
determining whether the copying involved protectable elements. 112 Here,
the court concluded that both programs were substantially similar, as a
whole,' 13 prior to proceeding with its analysis under the three-step
approach.
1. Levels of Abstraction
The court was careful to note that application of the abstractions test
will necessarily vary from case-to-case and program-to-program, due to the
"complex and ever-changing nature" of computer technology.1 14 Thus, it
declined to establish any strict methodology for the abstraction of com-
puter programs.
115
In this instance, the court utilized a method whereby computer pro-
grams are parsed into six levels of generally declining levels of abstrac-
tion. 116 These levels of abstraction include: the main purpose of the
program,11 7 the program structure or architecture, 1 8 modules, 119 algo-
rithms and data structures, 120 source code,
121 and object code.1 22
Under this analysis, the main purpose or function of a program will
always be an unprotected idea.123 Similarly, basic functions of a module
will likely be unprotectable. 124 However, the program's literal elements,
112. Gates, 9 F.3d at 833.
113. The district court found that Bando had access to the Gates Program and that the
Bando Program was copied from the Gates Program. Gates, 798 F. Supp. at 1516. On appeal,
Bando did not dispute those findings. Gates, 9 F.3d at 833 n.10.
114. Gates, 9 F.3d at 834.
115. Id. The court stated that it foresees, in most cases, the use of experts to provide
substantial guidance to courts in applying an abstractions test. Id. at 834-35.
116. Id. at 835. Ogilvie, supra note 27, at 528.
117. Gates, 9 F.3d at 835. The main purpose of a program is a description of the pro-
gram's function or what it is intended to do. Ogilvie, supra note 27, at 534.
118. Gates, 9 F.3d at 835. Program architecture or structure "is a description of how the
program operates in terms of its various functions, which are performed by discrete modules,
and how each of these modules interact with each other." Id.
119. Id. "A module typically consists of two components: operations and data types. An
operation identifies a particular result or set of actions that may be performed.... A data
type defines the type of item that an operator acts upon such as a student record or a daily
balance." Id.; see Ogilvie, supra note 27, at 536.
120. Gates, 9 F.3d at 835.
An algorithm is a specific series of steps that accomplish a particular operation.
Data structure is a precise representation or specification of a data type that consists
of: (i) basic data type groupings such as integers or characters, (ii) values, (iii)
variables, (iv) arrays or groupings of the same data type, (v) records or groupings of
different data types, and (vi) pointers or connections between records that set aside
space to hold the record's values.
Ogilvie, supra note 27, at 536-40; see Welas, 797 F.2d at 1230.
121. Gates, 9 F.3d at 835. Source code is the literal text of a computer program. Whelan,
797 F.2d at 1230.
122. Gates, 9 F.3d at 835. Object code is the literal text of a computer program written in
binary language through which the computer directly receives its instructions. Computer
Assocs. v. Altai, 982 F.2d 693, 698 (2nd Cir. 1992).




structure or architecture, and perhaps its algorithms and data structures
may contain protectable expression.1 25 The court did not dispute the dis-
trict court's abstractions analysis, and conceded that these generalized
levels of abstraction are not necessarily applicable to all computer codes,
but may facilitate the critical second step of filtering out unprotectable
elements of the program.
1 26
2. Filtration
The filtration step requires that courts filter out those elements of the
program that are not protected by copyright, requiring review of the idea-
expression dichotomy,' 27 process-expression dichotomy,1 28 as well as ap-
plication of the doctrines of merger 129 and scnes dfaire.
130
The court concluded that the district court failed to undertake a
proper filtration analysis.1 31 Specifically, the Gates Program constants
(program results) constituted facts not subject to copyright protection.
132
Further, the district court failed to adequately analyze the Gates Program
menus and sorting criteria,133 control and data flow,' 3 4 modules, 35 com-
mon errors, 136 fundamental tasks, 13 7 and install files. 138 Accordingly, the
court remanded these issues for further determination of copyright
protection.
3. Comparison
Due to the district court's inadequate analysis at the filtration stage,
the court did not undertake a comparison of the protectable portions of
the Gates Program with the Bando Program.
IV. ANALYSIS
After Autoskill and Gates, parties claiming copyright infringement of
their computer software programs will likely be subject to a narrower
three-step approach to substantial similarity, rather than a Whelan or Lotus
type of approach. Although the Autoskill court failed to endorse any one
125. See id.
126. Id. at 835-36 (the organization of a program into abstraction levels is a tool).
127. See supra text accompanying note 9.
128. Gates, 9 F.3d at 836.
129. Id.; see supra text accompanying note 86.
130. Gates, 9 F.3d at 836; see supra text accompanying note 87.
131. Gates, 9 F.3d at 830.
132. Id. at 842-43.
133. Id. at 843-44. "The district court failed to clarify whether it was referring to the
visual screen displays or some other aspect of the program when it discussed the menus and
sorting criteria ... ." Id.
134. Id. at 844. "The district court failed to define exactly what it meant by control flow
and data flow...." Id.
135. Id. at 845 (district court erroneously suggested that algorithms constitute processes,
protected only by patent law).
136. Id. (district court erroneously analyzed protection of program errors).
137. Id. at 846 (district court was unclear on what it meant by "fundamental tasks").
138. Id. (district court failed to make adequate findings concerning the install files).
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approach over another,18 9 the Gates court did so, and clarified the Tenth
Circuit's position on substantial similarity by adopting a substantial part of
the "Abstraction-Filtration-Comparison" method of analysis.
140
Additionally, the Gates court suggested a preliminary indirect method
of proving copying by examining the similarities as a whole, regardless of
the fact that even if the programs are copied verbatim, this is not a basis
for liability.1 4 ' As the court correctly noted, district courts may otherwise
be deprived of the "use of probative, and potentially essential, information
on the factual issue of copying" if it only extracts all protectable elements
prior to its comparison.' 42 The court acknowledges factual similarity may
create an unfair inference of misappropriation; however, evidence of in-
dependent creation may rebut this inference.
143
Finally, the court attempted to add guidance to the levels of abstrac-
tion test. Commentators have criticized the Autoskill district court for the
manner in which the abstractions step was employed.1 44 In an obvious
attempt to respond to these criticisms, the Gates court identified six gener-
ally declining abstraction levels for guidance.' 45 However, the court was
quick to qualify application of the abstraction test to a case-by-case and
program-by-program basis generally requiring the aid of expert testi-
mony. 146 Thus, the court left the door open for future discordant
applications.
147
Expert testimony may also create problems for courts as evident in
the Autoskill decision. NESS challenged the district court's reliance on
Autoskill's substantial similarity expert.148 The court rejected these argu-
ments after little inquiry. t 49 Autoskill's expert, Dr. Olson, was admittedly
not a computer programmer. 150 His qualifications included a Ph.D. in
psychology151 and a strong background in reading education and the use
139. Autoskill, 994 F.2d at 1492. ("[W]e feel that the judge used a permissible method of
analysis and reached reasonable conclusions, although we are not deciding which precise
method of analysis should be followed in a final copyright decision.").
140. Gates, 9 F.3d at 834.
141. Id. at 832 n.7 ("[Clopying of even unprotected elements can have a probative value
in determining whether the defendant copied the plaintiff's work" because "it may be more
likely that protected elements were copied if there is evidence of copying among the unpro-
tected elements of the program.").
142. Id.
143. Id. at 833 n.8.
144. William T. Rintala, Copyright Update-Cases, Practicing Law Institute, PLI/Corp 725,
Jan. 1993 (unclear the Autoskill court applied these doctrines in any disciplined way). Ogil-
vie, supra note 27, at 530 (court apparently recognizes "skill levels" in educational software as
a "level of abstraction").
145. See supra notes 116-22 and accompanying text.
146. Gates, 9 F.3d at 834-35.
147. Id. at 834 n.12 ("[W]e note that the appropriate test to be applied and the order in
which its various components are to be applied in any particular case may vary depending on
the claims involved, the procedural posture of the suit, and the nature of the computer
programs at issue.").
148. Autoskill 994 F.2d at 1493 n.19.
149. Id. at 1492-93.




of software in reading education. 15 2 He had also reviewed cases and the
Nimmer treatise on copyright infringement prior to trial.15 3 On the one
hand, the district court found this computer program "complex,"154 yet a
Ph.D. in psychology qualified Olson to dissect the program's constituent
parts for purposes of a copyright infringement action.' 55 Both the district
and the Tenth Circuit courts' reliance on Dr. Olson's testimony appears
misplaced in light of his apparent lack of training and background neces-
sary in an area requiring very specialized expertise.
Finally, although not directly an issue in Gates, the court addressed
concerns surrounding copyright protection extending "to the methodol-
ogy or processes adopted by the computer programmer, rather than
merely to the 'writing' expressing his ideas." 156 Processes or methods of
operation themselves are not copyrightable; however, "an author's de-
scription of that process, so long as it incorporates some originality, may
be protectable."1
57
The Autoskill court addressed this issue directly, but with little clarity.
Specifically, the district court rejected NESS's argument that the keying
procedure employed by the Autoskill Program's audio visual matching test
was a "method" and therefore, not subject to copyright protection.
5 8
Autoskill's witnesses testified that the Autoskill Program did not simply
involve touching key 1, 2, or 3, but required the student to look at the
word on the screen and respond with his or her hands on the keyboard. 159
Further, this system took considerable investigation, research, statistician,
and programming efforts. 160
The Tenth Circuit concluded that this testimony reflected that the
Autoskill Program was unique16 ' and demonstrated at least a minimal de-
gree of creativity for purposes of a preliminary injunction. 16 2 Moreover,
NESS failed to produce evidence that this procedure was common prac-
tice 163 or that it was dictated by efficiency considerations requiring exclu-
sion at the filtration stage.164 Although the Tenth Circuit found that
NESS failed to show the keying procedure was common practice, Autos-
kill's own witness, Dr. Olson, testified that though not a standard proce-
dure, it is present in other programs.'
65
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1561.
154. I& at 1570.
155. Id. at 1561. Dr. Olson considered the programs as a whole to reach his conclusions
regarding substantial similarity. Id.
156. Gates, 9 F.3d at 836.
157. i at 837.
158. Autoskill, 994 F.2d at 1495 n.23. Copyright protection does not extend to any "pro-
cess" or "method of operation." 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
159. Autoskill, 994 F.2d at 1495.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. 1i at 1495 n.23.
163. 1i (Autoskill Program was not drawn from prior Doehring research).
164. AutoskiU, 994 F.2d at 1495 n.23.
165. Autoshili, 793 F. Supp. at 1569.
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The test for determining whether a work contains original copyright-
able subject matter rests on whether it is an "original work of author-
ship."1 6 6 If so, the second requirement is that it "be fixed in any tangible
medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which it can
be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or
with the aid of a machine or device." 167 In this instance, the keying proce-
dure appears to meet the fixation requirement as it employs read-commu-
nication together with keyboard response. However, it is less clear that it
satisfied the originality requirement. The court does not expressly state
the keying procedure is original to Autoskill, but only that it was not cop-
ied from a particular prior public domain study.168 Perhaps this finding is
intended to imply Autoskill's independent creation. However, the court
finds only that it contained the requisite degree of creativity.1 69 Moreover,
the level or amount of an author's labor has no bearing on whether it
constitutes an original work. Although the district court acknowledged
the inapplicability of the "sweat of the brow" doctrine, 170 the Tenth Cir-
cuit appeared to provide weight to Autoskill's labor and effort in develop-
ing the program. 171 Even if the court viewed the keying procedure as a
compilation 172 for purposes of copyright protection, compilations must
meet the not-so-stringent original work of authorship test.1 73 Thus, the
Tenth Circuit failed to make clear whether the Autoskill Program's keying
procedure was an original work of authorship entitled to copyright
protection.
Despite the gaps remaining in the court's analysis in Autoskill the
Gates decision provides a clearer framework upon which to determine sub-
stantial similarity.
166. Original, for purposes of copyright, "means only that the work was independently
created by the author (as opposed to copied from other works) and that it possesses at least
some minimal degree of creativity." Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340,
345 (1991).
167. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
168. Autoskil4 994 F.2d at 1496.
169. Id. at 1495 n.23.
170. Autoskill 793 F. Supp. at 1571 ("An analysis of originality can only be based upon the
protectable elements of the program [s]" and this opinion is not based in any way upon evi-
dence of the time and effort it put into developing the Autoskill Program.).
171. Autoskill 994 F.2d at 1495 & n.23.
Autoskill system did not simply involve touching keys 1, 2, or 3, but involved looking
at the word on the screen and responding with hands on the keyboard, a system
that took considerable investigation and research staff work, and also that of statisti-
cians and programmers. This testimony shows that the Autoskill program was
unique and was not drawn directly from the Doehring research.
Id. at 1495 (citation omitted). This proof also disposes of a related argument regarding
NESS's contention that this is a "method" not protected by copyright. Id. at 1495 n.23.
172. A "compilation" is the selection and arrangement of uncopyrightable facts into a
format that is copyrightable. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 349.
173. Id at 349 (even if the work contains absolutely no protectable expression, only facts,





The need for coherent computer software copyright law is evidenced
by the varied and inharmonious substantial similarity tests currently ap-
plied among the Circuits. 174 Although some of the resulting chaos is un-
doubtedly due to the youth of software copyright law, it is not known
whether the Tenth Circuit's use of yet another method of analysis will
serve to magnify this confusion, or reduce it. Certainly, the Autoskill'75
and Gates176 decisions shed some light on the future direction the Tenth
Circuit will take concerning substantial similarity analysis. District courts
struggling to determine copyright infringement of computer software pro-
grams now have at least a framework for their analysis. Most notably, these
opinions espouse a narrower three-step approach, combining abstraction,
filtration, and comparison, together with a preliminary indirect compari-
son of the programs. This method constitutes the preferable method of
analysis for Tenth Circuit district courts in determining substantial similar-
ity of computer software programs.
Wendy j Pijher
174. "[C]ase law and commentators in the area of copyright protection seem woefully ill-
equipped to provide a systematic means for analyzing copyright issues as they arise in the
context of computer software." Gates, 798 F. Supp. at 1502.
175. 994 F.2d 1476 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 307 (1993).
176. 9 F.3d 823 (10th Cir. 1993).
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